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The troika should recognise the efforts made by Portugal to
rebalance its finances and adjust the country’s bailout
conditions.
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In May 2011 Portugal negotiated an IMF-EU bailout package of 78 billion euros, designed to help the
country stabilise its finances. In return Portugal agreed to implement a number of reforms, with a
target to reduce its budget deficit to 2.5 per cent by 2014. Paulo Trigo Pereira assesses the
country’s progress over the last two years, and suggests some new measures to aid the recovery.
He argues that the troika should consider decreasing the interest rates and extending maturity
dates on its loans to Portugal.
The idea that any country can change its economic structure, its budgetary framework, its
budgetary culture, and its institutions within the short period of an adjustment programme (typically
three or four years) is simply unrealistic. It is not possible to correct the errors of past decades in a couple of years
and this will not happen. The right perspective to look at a bailout adjustment programme is that it is the beginning of
a ten year process of reform, which includes fiscal consolidation, economic structural reform and institutional reform
(including constitutional) in order to guarantee the long term sustainability of public finances. However, it is
necessary to combine economic and institutional reform with democratic legitimacy. This needs consensus building
across political parties. One lesson of the Italian election is that it is not enough to do the right things: it is essential
that citizens also understand them and start seeing some light at the end of the tunnel.
Nearly two years on from its bailout, and in the week that the EU’s finance ministers gathered to discuss it, now is an
apt time to take stock of Portugal’s adjustment programme and the progress that has been made in the country,
while also addressing what may be unrealistic projections for the future. There is a need to revise the adjustment
programme and clarify the role of the European Central Bank (ECB) in the short term, although in the medium term
this will not be enough. Portugal also needs domestic changes, as well as a stronger, more federal European
Political Union, with economic governance, and a Treasury and budget directed towards the people who are
suffering from adjustment policies.
Some key facts about Portugal
Portugal has never had a fiscal surplus since its transition to democracy in 1974, which is quite unique among
European countries. This simple fact shows that, until quite recently, there has been a political culture which dictated
that deficits do not matter. In February 2013, the Portuguese Parliament approved changes in the Budget
Framework Law (BFL) in order to introduce the provisions of the “Fiscal Compact”. However, the BFL is not a Law
requiring a supermajority to be changed, so it is not as stable as it should be.
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In May 2011 the then socialist government approved a bailout programme of €78 billion (of which €12 billion was for
bank recapitalisation) with the acquiescence of opposition right wing parties. In June, elections put the socialists out
of power and a new government was elected. Therefore, we have now had 21 months of the bailout adjustment
programme and we can look at some data.
The current sixth revision of the programme establishes a consolidation path of reducing the public deficit from 9.8
per cent of GDP in 2010, to 5.9 per cent in 2011, 5 per cent in 2012, 4.5 per cent in 2013, and 2.5 per cent in 2014.
The target for 2011 was achieved (a deficit of 4.4 per cent) through extraordinary revenues. The target for 2012 may
not be reached, even with extraordinary revenue (accounting for 0.5 per cent of GDP) that the government has
considered, but EUROSTAT may not accept to register (the privatisation of ANA, Aeroportos de Portugal). Missing
the fiscal target in 2012 is down to an over-evaluation of fiscal revenues, particularly VAT. All major fiscal revenues
were below the budget estimates and the deviation was around €3 billion, or 1.8 per cent of GDP. This was a result,
on the one hand, of a higher than expected contraction of consumption and imports, and on the other hand of gross
miscalculations within the Ministry of Finance.
As expected, a pro-cyclical fiscal policy had a negative effect on economic growth and employment. The real
variation of GDP was a fall of 1.6 per cent in 2011, and a fall of 3.2 per cent in 2012. Austerity measures lead to a
collapse in domestic demand, which was compensated for by positive developments in net external demand in the
last quarter of 2011 and half of 2012. Unemployment has been rising from 12.9 per cent in 2010 to an expected 17.6
per cent, particularly among younger citizens, and public debt has reached 120 per cent of GDP.
The main positive short term economic consequences of the adjustment programme are twofold. The current
account balance which was highly in deficit in the past is now almost balanced (-0.2 per cent of GDP in 2012). Also,
the public corporations, which are considered within general government, are improving their economic results.
Finally, at the start of this year Portugal went to the capital markets to borrow €2.5 billion with a medium term
maturity (5 years) for the first time since the beginning of the adjustment programme. This was a relative success.
Some credit must be given to the government’s strong commitment to fiscal consolidation, but a considerable part of
the credit should also be attributed to the President of the ECB, Mario Draghi .
What lies ahead?
What lies ahead depends as much on Portugal as it depends on the evolution of the European Economy and the
actions of the European Commission, the ECB and the IMF (the troika). But one thing is sure, the period 2013-2016
will not be easy, and Europe and Portugal are still some distance away from overcoming the current crisis. Last
autumn the government and the troika forecasted a recession of 1 per cent for 2013. At the same time a panel of
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independent economists predicted a recession no smaller than 2 per cent.
The Bank of Portugal has since revised its growth forecasts down (now to a fall of 1.9 per cent) and in February
2013 the Portuguese government and the European Commission endorsed this forecast. The continuation of the
recession into 2013 has been caused by a combination of : i) the recession in other Eurozone countries, which are
the main export markets of Portugal; ii) relatively adverse financial conditions (the Portuguese Government
borrowed €1.155 billion for 12 months at 1.27 per cent, while Germany on the same day (20/02/13) borrowed at 1.66
per cent for 10 year bonds); iii) relative high taxes when compared with Eastern European countries; and iv) the
continuation of pro-cyclical and unstable fiscal policies.
Portugal has to do its part by following a consolidation path and taking measures to promote growth and
employment. One example of the wrong type of measure is the application of the top VAT rate to restaurants, which
led to small restaurants facing bankruptcy, decreased employment and in all likelihood a fall in VAT revenues. On
the other hand the renegotiation of public-private partnership (PPPs), which the government has started, but without
much success, should be a priority. Over this period, Portugal will have its peak expenditures on PPPs (€1.5 billion
in 2014), which will surpass 1 billion euros per annum until 2019.
The “troika” also has to help, particularly by extending the maturities of loans and decreasing interest rates. Figure 1
illustrates the huge borrowing requirements of Portugal in the forthcoming years (€48.8 billion in three years – 2014-
16 – excluding the rollover of European Financial Stability Facility (EFSF) funds in 2015). An extension of maturities
of long term debt is essential and a decreasing of interest rates and commissions also seems urgent.  This week
(5th March) the ECOFIN Ministers “discussed whether EU Finance Ministers would be ready in principle to consider
an adjustment of the maturities on the EFSF and EFSM loans to Ireland and Portugal in order to smooth the debt
redemption profiles of both countries.” The fiscal target for 2014 and 2015 should also be somewhat relaxed. It is
simply not possible to get a 2.5 per cent deficit in 2014 without a deep recessive impact. Even a 3 per cent target
will be difficult to achieve. 
Figure 1: Portugal’s Medium and Long Term Debt
Source: IGCP- Portuguese Treasury and Debt Management Agency
A recent study from a large private bank (BPI) has indicated that the EFSF is borrowing at an average rate of 1.5 per
cent and charging Portugal 3 per cent. This means that there is some room for maneuver to decrease interest rates
of the EFSF and EFSM to say 1.9 per cent or 2 per cent. This would be much more beneficial than an extension of
maturities (and should complement that measure). Unless there is some decrease in interest rates, or the restrictive
fiscal policy, the situation will continue to depress domestic demand, aggravating recession and promoting social
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unrest. The austerity measures adopted in 2012, and the large increase in taxes in 2013, are eroding social support
for the adjustment programme.
It is likely that the EU Finance Ministers and the troika will agree on extending maturities an extra year for the
excessive deficit to be corrected. But this will not be enough. If debt interest rates do not go down, the amount of
expenditure cuts will be of sufficient magnitude to depress the economy even further. Therefore, in order to facilitate
access to capital markets, and decrease interest rates, the ECB should clarify the conditions under which it will
launch the Outright Monetary Transactions in countries like Ireland and Portugal.
Large demonstrations in 18 cities (about half a million in Lisbon) on March 2 nd illustrate that Europe and the troika
should recognise the efforts that are being made by Portuguese citizens, and should acknowledge that they have
made overly optimistic forecasts on the deficit, debt, growth, and employment. The effects of austerity are much
larger than those anticipated by the troika. On the other hand, the Portuguese government should be much more
innovative and creative in measures that promote employment, exports and economic growth. Unless sufficient
measures are put in place at the European and domestic levels, Portugal will see a progressive decline of its
economic base and will not be capable of regaining economic growth, employment creation and full access to
capital markets.
These are the “small things” that have to be done in the short term. In the medium and long term either Europe
progresses decidedly towards further political integration with the countries that want to move forward, and based on
a common sense of solidarity among the peoples of Europe, or the euro, as it exists today, will collapse. The
European Commission cannot be seen to be the ‘bad guys’ who, with the IMF and ECB, implement austerity
measures that lead to unemployment and poverty for hundreds of thousands of citizens in peripheral countries, and
keep youth unemployment high. It also must show, not in words but in practical terms, the meaning of solidarity: or
what Adam Smith called “sympathy”. This can be done with economic governance, with a Treasury, and a budget
that assumes, at a Union level, some of the redistribution allowances of the Member States, targeted to youth
employment and elderly poverty, and not just to farmers.
If Europe shows its human face, and makes progress towards reforming the treaties, it may win the support of
European citizens and have democratic legitimacy for further political integration. If not, it will be impossible to
sustain fragile coalitions that still support austerity measures in peripheral countries. We are still far away from
solving the euro crisis, but this is a complementary story…
Please read our comments policy before commenting .
Note:  This article gives the views of the author, and not the position of EUROPP – European Politics and Policy, nor
of the London School of Economics.
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